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DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE LOST CAUSE
Published in: Flagpole Magazine (November 9, 2011) (online
edition).
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University
of Georgia School of Law.

The term Lost Cause originated in 1866 when a
Virginia journalist named Edward A. Pollard published a
book with that title which blamed Jefferson Davis for the
defeat of the Confederate States of America. For many
years now the term has referred to and embodied a
romanticized, mythical view of the Old South in regard to
the Civil War. As Georgia history professor David Williams
notes, the Lost Cause projects an image “of an idyllic South,
populated by a chivalric race of cavaliers who were kind
masters to happy slaves–a utopian South, beaten and broken
by superior northern numbers and industry . . . ”

Although the Lost Cause is mythology, it is still viewed
as historical truth by many credulous persons and even
defended as an accurate account of the past by various proSouth groups (as well as by racist demagogues). This year
marks the 150th anniversary of the bombardment of Ft.
Sumter and the outbreak of the Civil War. What better time
to demythologize the Lost Cause? Therefore, I will now
expose the dubiousness of nine of the most important myths
of the Lost Cause. I rely on an impressive, growing body of
Civil War literature by history professors and other scholars
that step by step, again and again, usually without any
serious contradiction, has demonstrated that the Lost Cause
is a false cause.
Myth No. 1 The principal reason the Southern states seceded
was states’ rights, not slavery.

Although no one denies that the issue of states’ rights
was of vital importance in the Old South, the overwhelming
consensus among modern historians is that slavery was the
single most important reason the Southern states seceded.
Secession occurred principally because the South dearly
loved and passionately desired to vindicate the institution of
black slavery.
South Carolina was the first state to secede. On Dec. 24,
1860, four days after approving the Ordinance of Secession,
the state’s Secession Convention approved a “Declaration of
the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the
Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union.” This
weird document–passed by god-fearing white Southerners
who believed that God is a proslavery deity, that the Bible is
a proslavery book, and that no true Christian could be
opposed to slavery–proves beyond a reasonable doubt that

slavery was the main impetus for that state’s decision to
secede. Almost all the grievances listed to justify splitting
the Union involve slavery, slavery, slavery. The bizarre
document even states:
“Those [Northern, free] States have assumed the right
of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions
[slavery]; and have denied the rights of property [slavery]
established in fifteen of the States and recognized by the
Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of
slavery; they have permitted open establishment among
them of [antislavery] societies, whose avowed object is to
disturb the peace and to eloign the [slave] property of the
citizens of other States. They have encouraged and assisted
thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who
remain, have been incited by emissaries, books and pictures
to servile insurrection.” (My italics.)

Alexander Stephens, a Georgian who was Vice
President of the Confederate States of America, delivered a
speech in Savannah on March 21, 1861. This speech, known
as the “Cornerstone Speech,” is powerful evidence that it
was mainly the issue of slavery that led to the dissolution of
the Union and the consequent formation of the Confederacy.
In the course of his infamous speech, Stephens said:
“The new [Confederate] constitution has put at rest,
forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar
institution African slavery as it exists amongst us the proper
status of the negro [sic] in our form of civilization. This was
the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution.
. . . The prevailing ideas entertained by [Thomas Jefferson]
and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the
formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement
of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it

was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It
was an evil they knew not well how to deal with, but the
general opinion of the men of that day was that, somehow or
other in the order of Providence, the institution would be
evanescent and pass away. . . . Those ideas, however, were
fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of
the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy
foundation, and the government built upon it fell when the
‘storm came and the wind blew.’
“Our new government is founded upon exactly the
opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests,
upon the great truth that the negro [sic] is not equal to the
white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is
his natural and normal condition. This, our new government,
is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great
physical, philosophical, and moral truth.” (My italics.)

Myth No. 2 In the winter of 1860-1861, prior to the firing on
Ft. Sumter, there was overwhelming Southern support for
secession.
In the months before Ft. Sumter was bombarded on
April 12, 1861, the South was, as Georgia history professor
David Williams explains in his book Deeply Divided: The
South’s Inner Civil War (2008), “badly divided” on the issue
of secession, as the elections for members of the various state
secession conventions demonstrated. “Throughout the Deep
South, official returns gave secession’s opponents about 40
percent of the popular vote.” Opponents of secession
(known as unionists or co-operationists) “ran neck and neck
with secessionists in Alabama and Louisiana. . . . In Texas,
two-thirds of voters opposed secession.” Additionally, prosecession elements committed so much widespread fraud at
the ballot box and in the vote-counting that “the returns

cannot be trusted as a gauge of popular opinion. Most
likely, anti-secession sentiment was considerably stronger
than the final vote would suggest.” Here in Georgia,
Williams points out, secessionist Governor Joe Brown
“falsely claimed that secessionist delegates had carried the
state by over thirteen thousand votes. In fact, existing
records from the time suggest that secession was probably
defeated by just over a thousand votes.”
Throughout the Southern states, secessionists used
coercion and subterfuge to discourage or prevent opponents
of secession from voting against secession. “So worried were
secessionist leaders over the possibility of secession being
voted down that they used intimidation and violence in their
efforts to control the ballot box wherever they could.”
The current historical consensus that there was broadbased opposition to secession throughout the Old South in

the months immediately preceding April 1861 is summarized
by David Potter in his book Lincoln and His Party in the
Secession Crisis (1995):
“At no time during the winter of 1860-1861 was
secession desired by a majority of the people in the slave
states. . . . Furthermore, secession was not basically desired
even by a majority in the lower South, and the secessionists
succeeded less because of the intrinsic popularity of their
program than because of the extreme skill with which they
utilized an emergency psychology . . .”
Myth No. 3 After Ft. Sumter was fired on there was no
significant opposition to secession in the South.
Although the South was electrified and the secession
cause hugely strengthened during what David Williams calls
“the passionate post-Sumter excitement,” nonetheless “there
were large cracks in the facade of southern unity.” Williams

gives examples: in eastern Tennessee, two-thirds of the
voters voted against approving the legislature’s secession
ordinance; in North Carolina, nearly one-third of the
delegates at the state’s secession convention were unionists;
and in Virginia, the election which ratified secession “was
rife with fraud and intimidation [against opponents of
secession].”
Myth No. 4 Unlike the North, the South during the Civil War
respected civil liberties, did not abuse its arrest powers, and did
not imprison supposedly disloyal citizens.
This myth has been exploded by historian Mark E.
Neely, Jr., in two books: Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis
and Civil Liberties (1993), and Southern Rights: Political
Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism
(1999). Neely points out that “the Confederate government
curtailed many civil liberties and imprisoned troublesome

citizens. Moreover, many white Confederate citizens
submitted docilely to being treated as only slaves could have
been treated in the antebellum South.” Passports were
required, for example, for civilians who traveled by train,
and Confederate citizens attempting to board trains “were
likely to have irritating encounters with military officials who
asked them nosy questions about their identity and
destination. Guards and inquisitors confronted citizens on
every railroad and at many crossroads.”
After arduous research, Neely discovered records
proving that at least “4,108 civilian prisoners [were] held by
military authority in the Confederacy. There were many
more political prisoners than these, but I was able to locate
records by name for only 4,108 in some five years of
searching.” Neely also discovered that “the Confederate
Army’s first arrest of a citizen occurred on 14 April 1861,

even before President Abraham Lincoln called out troops to
suppress the rebellion.” Finally, Neely discovered that “the
number of civilians arrested by military authority in the
Confederacy, when adjusted for population differences,
appears to be about the same as the number arrested in the
North.”
Neely concludes: “Knowledge of the existence of
thousands of political prisoners now reverses our basic
understanding of the Confederate Cause. . . . [T]he
Confederate government restricted civil liberties as modern
democratic nations did in war.”
Myth No. 5 Disloyalty was not a major problem in the
Confederacy.
This myth began crumbling years ago with the
publication of Georgia Lee Tatum’s Disloyalty in the
Confederacy (1934). More recent works include Jon L.

Wakelyn, Confederates Against the Confederacy: Essays on
Leadership and Loyalty (2002); William W. Freehling, The
South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (2001); and Maurice
Melton, Disloyal Confederates, 16 Civil War Times Illustrated
12 (August 1977). (The related topic of the massive number
of desertions from the Confederate army is examined in
Mark A. Weitz, More Damning Than Slaughter: Desertion in
the Confederate Army (2005).)
There is insufficient space here to survey the enormous
amount of evidence adduced by numerous scholars for the
existence of what Ms. Tatum calls the “widespread
disaffection in the Confederacy.” It will suffice to quote this
passage from her book: “[T]here were a few at the beginning
of the war and many before the end of the war [who] did not
stand loyally behind Jefferson Davis and the Stars and Bars

in support of the Confederacy. While many showed their
disaffection only by refusing to fight for, or to give active
support to, the Confederacy, others went so far as to organize
not only for self-protection but also for injury to the
Confederacy and aid to the Union. Before the close of the
war there was considerable disaffection in every state of the
Confederacy, and many of the disloyal formed into bands–in
some states into well organized secret treasonable societies, of
which the most potent and pernicious were the Order of the
Heroes of America, the Peace Society, and the Peace and
Constitutional Society.”
Myth No. 6 Hardly any Southern white men joined the Union
army and fought for the North.
This myth has been demolished by two books: Charles
C. Anderson, Fighting by Southern Federals (1912), and
Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers

from the Confederacy (1992). We now know that around
100,000 white males from Confederate states served in the
Union army, compared to around 900,000 Southerners who
served in the Confederate army. As Current notes, “the
100,000 who fought for the Union represented a loss of 10
percent of the Confederacy’s military manpower. In reality,
the Confederacy suffered a double loss, since the 100,000
loyalists must not only be subtracted from the strength of the
Confederacy but also be added to the strength of the Union.”
Myth No. 7 During the Civil War Southern black slaves
loyally supported their masters and backed the Confederate
cause.
The vilest of the myths of the Lost Cause is the “faithful
slave” myth–the fiction that during the Civil War Southern
slaves were on the side of the Confederacy. The truth is the
exact opposite. There are mountains of evidence that black

slaves all over the South did whatever they could to impede
and undermine the Confederate cause and to support the
Union cause.
Thus, in Bitterly Divided, Prof. Williams notes:
• “Slaves resisted slavery by feigning ignorance or
illness, sabotaging plantation equipment, and roaming freely
in defiance of the law.”
• Countless slaves ran away from their masters, and
“[t]hose who did not escape gave aid to those who did.”
• Many black slaves spied for the Union. “Very often
[Union] intelligence came from escaping slaves, who brought
news of fortifications, military movements, and Confederate
troop strength. . . . There was even a black Union spy in the
Confederate White House.”
• “In May 1862 Roberts Smalls and several other slaves
ran the transport steamer Planter, with its cargo of

ammunition and artillery, out of Charleston harbor and
turned it over to blockading Federals.”
• “Over two hundred thousand African Americans
served with the Union’s land and naval forces during the
Civil War. More than three-fourths of them were
southerners, most formerly enslaved.”
Williams concludes:
“Southern blacks undermined the Confederate war
effort whenever they could. They gave refuge to deserters
[from the Confederate army], carried food to deserter gangs
and fugitive slaves, spied for the Union army, and aided those
headed for Union lines. As a grateful former Union prisoner
of war later wrote, ‘They were always ready to help anybody
opposed to the Rebels. Union refugees, Confederate
deserters, escaped prisoners–all received from them the same
prompt and invariable kindness.’”

Myth No. 8 The South lost the Civil War due to external
causes rather than internal ones.
Strictly speaking, this is not a myth, but it is an
obsolescent view of why the Confederacy was defeated.
Traditionally, the principal explanations for the defeat of the
Confederacy have fallen into two categories: “external
causes” explanations, and “internal causes” explanations.
Under the external-causes approach, the North’s victory is
attributed to its superior material and economic resources
and its victories on the battlefield. Until recently, the
external-causes explanations predominated in scholarly
writings. In recent years, however, support for the internalcauses explanations has been steadily growing, and the most
important recent scholarship emphasizes internal-causes
explanations over external-causes explanations.

Under the internal-causes approach, the South lost
because of what took place within the Confederacy itself.
Today most scholars who embrace the internal-causes
explanations focus on what is called the South’s “inner civil
war.” According to this inner-civil war thesis, the
Confederacy collapsed because of defeatism, disloyalty,
disaffection, lack of unifying nationalism, corruption, class
and sectional conflicts, feuding within the Confederate
government itself and between the Confederate government
and the Confederate states, and because of massive
opposition to such unpopular Confederate war measures as
habeas corpus suspension, martial law, conscription, and
impressment of private property.
Under the current approach, therefore, the South was
not tragically but heroically crushed to pieces under the iron
heel of superior Northern resources. Rather, in the words of

Prof. Williams, “it was southerners themselves as much as
anyone else who were responsible for Confederate defeat.”
The Lost Cause view of why the South lost relies on the
falsehood that during the Civil War the South was united in
supporting the Confederacy.
For a few of the recent scholarly works that have
contributed to the new prominence of the internal-conflict
explanations for the Confederate States of America’s defeat,
see Eric Foner, The South’s Inner Civil War, American
Heritage 46 ((March 1989), and David Osher and Peter
Wallenstein, Why the Confederacy Lost: An Essay Review, 88
Md. Hist. Magazine 95 (1993).
Myth No. 9 John Wilkes Booth and his small band of misfits
planned and carried out Abraham Lincoln’s assassination and
their other crimes on their own, and the Confederate
government had nothing to do with the assassination.

To the contrary, in two 2005 Flagpole articles, Lincoln
Assassinated! and Lincoln Assassinated!, Part 2, which were
based on the latest historical research, I explained that the
Confederacy was not entirely free from guilt in the Lincoln
assassination. I pointed out:
• The Confederate States of America had secret services
which carried out espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage,
and covert operations.
• John Wilkes Booth was a Confederate secret services
operative.
• Agents of the Confederate secret services plotted
clandestine operations involving terrorist acts.
• In 1864 the Confederate secret services plotted to
abduct Lincoln, who was to be seized a few miles north of
Washington, D.C. by a party of armed men who would
transport their captive into Confederate territory where he

would be held prisoner in an effort to force the North to
agree to the independence of the South.
• Jefferson Davis and other top Confederate leaders
personally approved the Lincoln abduction plan, and the
person designated to be in charge of carrying out the
kidnaping operation was John Wilkes Booth.
• Only two weeks before Lincoln’s assassination,
Jefferson Davis approved a plot to kill Lincoln and his entire
Cabinet with a bomb that would be detonated at the White
House, and the Union did not succeed in putting the
operation out of action until April 10, 1865, four days before
Lincoln was assassinated at Ford’s Theater.
• The bomb plan only failed because the explosives
expert from a Confederate secret service who had been
detailed to detonate the bomb was, while being escorted to

Washington, D.C. by Confederate cavalry, unexpectedly
captured by Union cavalry a mere 15 miles from the District.
• Although he was not involved in the unsuccessful bomb
plot, Booth almost certainly knew of it; and in what was
surely no coincidence, Booth began planning to shoot Lincoln
on April 12, the day after a newspaper account revealed the
capture of the Confederate agent who was supposed to
detonate the bomb at the White House.
• Booth’s plot to shoot Lincoln personally, and to
simultaneously have coconspirators murder the vice
president and the secretary of state, was intended to cause
the same type of damage and havoc the White House bomb
explosion plot had been expected to cause.
• At least three of Booth’s sidekicks, Lewis Powell,
Samuel Mudd, and John Surratt, had engaged in
Confederate clandestine operations.

• On his escape route through Maryland and Virginia
after assassinating Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth traveled
along the path of an underground Confederate spy network
which had been used to secretly transport persons and goods
to and from the Confederacy, and as he moved along this
route Booth received assistance from members of the
clandestine organization operating the network.

